How Often Should Reputation Mechanisms Update a Trader's Reputation Profile?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
How Often Should Reputation Mechanisms Update a Trader's Reputation Profile?
Reputation mechanisms have become an important component of electronic markets, helping to build trust and elicit cooperation among loosely connected and geographically dispersed economic agents. Understanding the impact of different reputation mechanism design parameters on the resulting market efficiency has, thus, emerged as a question of theoretical and practical interest. Along these lines...
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Reputation mechanisms harness the bi-directional communication capabilities of the Internet in order to engineer large-scale word-of-mouth networks. Best known so far as a technology for building trust and fostering cooperation in online marketplaces, such as eBay, these mechanisms are poised to have a much wider impact on organizations. This paper surveys our progress in understanding the new ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Information Systems Research
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1047-7047,1526-5536
DOI: 10.1287/isre.1060.0092