How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field
نویسندگان
چکیده
School authorities in the UK and US advocate use of lotteries to desegregate schools. We study a school choice mechanism employed Berlin where lottery quota is embedded immediate acceptance (IA) mechanism, compare it deferred (DA) with quota. In both mechanisms, some seats are allocated based on academic achievement (e.g., grades), while randomly. find that, theory, strengthens truth-telling DA by eliminating non-truth-telling equilibria. Furthermore, equilibrium outcome stable for but not IA lottery. These predictions borne out experiment. Moreover, leads more diverse populations experiment, as predicted. Students lowest grades profit from introduction under than DA.
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0899-8256', '1090-2473']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.010