HOW DO INFORMAL AGREEMENTS AND REVISION SHAPE CONTRACTUAL REFERENCE POINTS?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
How Do Informal Agreements and Revision Shape Contractual Reference Points
The notion of contracts as reference points provides the basis for a deeper understanding of important phenomena such as the employment contract, vertical integration, firm scope, authority, and delegation. Previous experiments lend support to this notion but they ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex-post renegotiation or revision. Here we show th...
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Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)’s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. We investigate the relevance of these features experimentally. Our evidence indicates that the cent...
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Article history: Received 24 November 2015 Available online 27 December 2016 JEL classification: C72 C78 C92 D03 D86
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the European Economic Association
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1542-4766
DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12098