How Do Incentives Lead to Deception in Advisor–Client Interactions? Explicit and Implicit Strategies of Self-Interested Deception
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
How Do Incentives Lead to Deception in Advisor–Client Interactions? Explicit and Implicit Strategies of Self-Interested Deception
When confronted with important questions we like to rely on the advice of experts. However, uncertainty can occur regarding advisors' motivation to pursue self-interest and deceive the client. This can especially occur when the advisor has the possibility to receive an incentive by recommending a certain alternative. We investigated how the possibility to pursue self-interest led to explicit st...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Frontiers in Psychology
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1664-1078
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00527