How Do Global Credit-Rating Agencies Rate Firms from Developing Countries?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Asian Economic Papers
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1535-3516,1536-0083
DOI: 10.1162/asep.2003.2.3.30