How Do Elected Officials Evaluate Performance? Goal Preferences, Governance Preferences, and the Process of Goal Reprioritization

Does Constituency Size Affect Elected Officials’ Trade Policy Preferences?

Scholars have long argued that Presidents are less protectionist than Congress while Senators are less so than Representatives due to their larger constituencies. Yet until now this theory has escaped scrutiny. I argue that it is based on a misguided view of trade policy as distributive politics. I show via a series of tests that the theory is untenable. Unlike their differences in constituency...

Contingent Planning with Goal Preferences

The importance of the problems of contingent planning with actions that have non-deterministic effects and of planning with goal preferences has been widely recognized, and several works address these two problems separately. However, combining conditional planning with goal preferences adds some new difficulties to the problem. Indeed, even the notion of optimal plan is far from trivial, since...

Planning with Goal Preferences and Constraints

In classical planning, the planner is given a concrete goal; it returns a plan for it or a failure message. In the latter case, the user can either quit or modify the goal. For many applications, it is more convenient to let the user provide a more elaborate specification consisting of constraints and preferences over possible goal states. Then, let the system discover a plan for the most desir...

Portfolio selection through imprecise Goal Programming model: Integration of the manager`s preferences

In the portfolio selection problem, the manager considers several objectives simultaneously such as the rate of return, the liquidity and the risk of portfolios. These objectives are conflicting and incommensurable. Moreover, the objectives can be imprecise. Generally, the portfolio manager seeks the best combination of the stocks that meets his investment objectives. The imprecise Goal Program...

Elected officials.