How did the Sarbanes–Oxley Act affect managerial incentives? Evidence from corporate acquisitions

Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Stock Incentives*

We examine how corporate payout policy is affected by managerial stock incentives using data on more than 1100 nonfinancial firms during 1993-97. We find that management share ownership encourages higher payouts by firms with potentially the greatest agency problems—those with low market-to-book ratios and low management stock ownership. We also find that management stock options change the com...

The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007: how will it affect the medical world?

Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity∗

We analyze the differences between companies owned by private equity (PE) investors and similar public companies. We document that PE-owned companies provide higher managerial incentives to their top management: CEOs have almost twice as much equity, 10% lower salary, and more cash compensation than their counterparts at comparable public corporations. We also find some evidence that PE ownersh...

“ Essays on Corporate Governance , Managerial Incentives , and Crowdfunding ”

Ronghuo Zheng ([email protected]) “Essays on Corporate Governance, Managerial Incentives, and

Corporate Criminal Law and Organization Incentives: A Managerial Perspective∗

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provide...