How clientelism undermines state capacity: Evidence from Mexican municipalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
Does clientelism perpetuate the weak state capacity that characterizes many young democracies? Prior work explains clientelist parties skew public spending to private goods and under-supply goods. Building on these insights, this article argues creates a bureaucratic trap. Governments rely invest in labour-intensive, low-skilled bureaucracies can design implement relatively more straightforward distributive policies. Although such are useful win some elections, they cannot resolve complex social problems, so economic human development is hindered. Empirically, examines wage structure of municipal as proxy for personnel’s capital Mexico between 2012 2016. During period, turnover party power municipalities was frequent, situation also allows investigating how resilient trap increased competition. The results show all bureaucracies. However, has different grip Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), quintessential party, compared other parties. After an electoral turnover, their bureaucracies’ capital, PRI does not. While prior proposed clientelism-induced negative equilibria, offers direct path from capacity. help explain why fiscal resources, political competition, demand-side strategies fight vote buying insufficient underscore importance civil service reform tame clientelism.
منابع مشابه
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متن کاملCan Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin
This paper studies the electoral effects of town hall meetings based on programmatic, nonclientelist platforms. The experiment involves the cooperation of leading candidates in a presidential election in Benin. A campaign strategy based solely on these meetings was assigned to randomly selected villages and compared to the standard strategy of clientelist rallies. We find that treatment reduces...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Working Paper Series
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2624-9650']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.35188/unu-wider/2021/109-9