Household Behavior with Imperfect Labor Markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cherry-picking in Labor Markets with Imperfect Information
We study a competitive labor market with imperfect information. In our basic model, the labor market consists of heterogeneous workers and ex ante identical firms who have imperfect information about workers’ productivities. Firms compete by posting wages each round to win the right to make job offers, and take turns to cherry-pick more productive workers. We also consider extensions of the mod...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0019-8676,1468-232X
DOI: 10.1111/0019-8676.731998036