Hotelling’s location model with negative network externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mechanism and Network Design with Private Negative Externalities
A revenue-maximizing monopolist is selling a single indivisible good to buyers who face a loss if a rival buyer obtains it. The rivalry is modeled through a network, an arc between a pair of buyers indicates that a buyer considers another buyer its rival, and the magnitude of the loss is the private information of each buyer. First, given a network, we characterize the optimal mechanism. Second...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0615-0