Host Market Corruption and Multinational Enterprise Strategy

Global cities and multinational enterprise location strategy

Received: 25 November 2011 Revised: 19 February 2013 Accepted: 20 February 2013 Online publication date: 18 April 2013 Abstract We combine the concept of location derived by economic geographers with theories of the multinational enterprise (MNE) and the liability of foreignness developed by international business scholars, to examine the factors that propel MNEs toward, or away from, “global c...

Corporate link and competitive strategy in multinational enterprises: a perspective from subsidiaries seeking host market penetration

This study examines how the corporate link between a foreign subsidiary and its corporate members (parent and peer subsidiaries) is influenced by the subsidiary’s competitive strategy in a specific host country. The mainstream logic, especially that of Michael Porter, suggests that corporate link should be stronger when a multinational enterprise (MNE) focuses on cost leadership than on product...

Corruption and Product Market Competition∗

It is generally considered that more competition might help curb corruption, as rents, which motivate corrupt agreements, are decreasing in the degree of competition. This paper proposes a framework to analyze the relationship between corruption and competition. It studies the optimal incentive scheme for potentially corrupt officials in charge of inspecting firms that compete in the product ma...

Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational Enterprise

Institutional Distance and the Multinational Enterprise

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