Holdup and the Evolution of Bargaining Conventions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
formation and evolution of regional organizations: the case study of the economic cooperation organization (eco)
abstract because of the many geopolitical, geo economical and geo strategically potentials and communicational capabilities of eco region, members can expand the convergence and the integration in base of this organization that have important impact on members development and expanding peace in international and regional level. based on quality analyzing of library findings and experts interv...
15 صفحه اولConventions and Social Mobility in Bargaining Situations
This paper studies the evolution of a population whose members use their social class to coordinate their actions in a simple tacit bargaining game. In the spirit of Rosenthal and Landau [1979], we interpret the equilibrium behaviours that the players may adopt, as a function of their class, as customs. Players may change their class depending on the outcome of the game, and may also change the...
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This paper studies long run equilibrium selection in 2x2 coordination games in a framework that accounts for the effect of players’ mobility, local interaction, and scale of interaction. I find that the stochastic stability of a particular convention depends both on the importance of scale effects relative to the degree of local interaction, and the efficiency and risk characteristics of a part...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2001
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.277910