Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points*
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ownership, incentives, and the hold-up problem
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Quarterly Journal of Economics
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0033-5533,1531-4650
DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.267