Heterogeneous Beliefs with Finite-Lived Agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Heterogeneous Beliefs with Finite-Lived Agents
This paper will examine a model with many agents, each of whom has a different belief about the dynamics of a risky asset. The agents are Bayesian and so learn about the asset over time. All agents are assumed to have a finite (but random) lifetime. When an agent dies, he passes his wealth (but not his knowledge) onto his heir. As a result, the agents never become sure of the dynamics of the ri...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1440210