Herding with collective preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Herding with Collective Preferences
This paper studies a simple model of observational learning where agents care not only about the information of others but also about their actions. We show that despite complex strategic considerations that arise from forward-looking incentives, herd behavior can arise in equilibrium. The model encompasses applications such as sequential elections, public good contributions, and leadership cha...
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This paper studies a simple model of observational learning where agents care not only about the information of others but also about their actions. We show that despite the complex strategic considerations that arise from forward-looking incentives, herd behavior can arise in equilibrium. Our results have application to understanding momentum in sequential elections, and inefficiencies in sequ...
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Agents partition deterministic outcomes into good or bad. A direct revelation mechanism selects a lottery over outcomes — also interpreted as time-shares. Under such dichotomous preferences, the probability that the lottery outcome be a good one is a canonical utility representation. The utilitarian mechanism averages over all deterministic outcomes “approved” by the largest number of agents. I...
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In recent years, scholars have turned to alternative representations of utility to capture motivational heterogeneity across individuals. In the research reported here, we examine two models of heterogeneous utility—linear-altruism and inequity-aversion—in the context of two-person, social dilemma games. Empirical tests are conducted drawing on data from experiments and surveys. We find that th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0609-7