Herd Behavior, Bank Runs and Information Disclosure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information Acquisition in Rumor-Based Bank Runs
We study the endogenous information acquisition and withdrawal-redeposit decisions of individual agents when a liquidity event triggers a spreading rumor and therefore exposes a bank to a run. Uncertainty about the bank’s liquidity and potential failure motivates agents who hear the rumor to acquire additional information. Although the bank run equilibrium is unique given the additional signal’...
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We study how a government should optimally disclose information about banks’ assets during a financial crisis. The government can also use its resources to stop runs and unfreeze credit markets. Disclosure improves welfare by reducing adverse selection, but it can also create runs on weak banks. A credible fiscal backstop mitigates these risks and allows the government to pursue efficient but r...
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and Headnote We put “runs” back in the bank runs literature. A unified bank, one that invests in both liquid and illiquid assets, can easily avoid runs but it still faces a small probability of non-run rationing of depositors. In a separated financial system, the bank only holds relatively liquid assets; it is subject to runs with small probability, but because of its overinvestment in the liqu...
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We study the Diamond-Dybvig [3] model as developed in Green and Lin [5] and Peck and Shell [7]. We dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors. Instead, our bank is a self-interested agent with a technological advantage in recordkeeping. We examine the implications of the resulting agency problem for the design of bank contracts and the possibility of bank-run equilibria. Fo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.587481