Health insurance and ex ante moral hazard: evidence from Medicare
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The other ex ante moral hazard in health.
It is well-known that pooled insurance coverage can induce people to make inefficiently low investments in self-protective activities. We identify another ex ante moral hazard that runs in the opposite direction. Lower levels of self-protection and the associated chronic conditions and behavioral patterns such as obesity, smoking, and malnutrition increase the incidence of many diseases and con...
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Existence of pure strategy equilibria is studied in health insurance markets that exhibit both ex ante adverse selection of the Rothschild–Stiglitz–Wilson type, and ex post hidden information moral hazard. It is found that ex post moral hazard has two offsetting effects on the existence of equilibrium, and that in general it is difficult to say whether an equilibrium is more or less likely to e...
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Under certain conditions the optimal insurance policy will offer full coverage above a deductible, as Arrow and others have shown long time ago. Interestingly, the same design of insurance policies applies in case of a single loss and ex-ante moral hazard. However, many insurance policies provide coverage against a variety of losses and the possibilities for the insured to affect the probabilit...
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We study a dynamic insurance market with asymmetric information and ex post moral hazard. In our model, the insurance buyer’s risk type is unknown to the insurer; moreover, the buyer has the option of not reporting losses. The insurer sets premia according to the buyer’s risk rating that is computed via Bayesian estimation based on buyer’s history of reported claims. Accordingly, the buyer has ...
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This paper investigates the topping-up scheme in health insurance when both public and private firms use linear contracts. First, the case with identical consumers is analyzed. The optimal public coverage is derived both when the firms play simultaneously and when they play sequentially. In the former case consumers are over-insured, whereas, in the latter case, the second-best allocation is ob...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1389-6563,1573-6962
DOI: 10.1007/s10754-009-9056-4