Hart–Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract This paper formally introduces Hart–Mas-Colell consistency for general (possibly multi-valued) solutions cooperative games with transferable utility. notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on domain of convex games. Moreover, we all nonempty satisfying individual rationality, anonymity, scale covariance, superadditivity, weak consistency, and converse consistency. family consists (a) Shapley value, (b) homothetic images value as center homothety positive ratios not larger than one, (c) their relative interiors.
منابع مشابه
Consistency , anonymity , and the core on the domain of convex games ∗
Peleg (1986) and Tadenuma (1992) provide two well-known axiomatic characterizations of the core on the domain of balanced TU games. Peleg’s characterization says that the core is the only solution that satisfies non-emptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, and a reduced game property introduced by Davis and Maschler (1965). Tadenuma’s characterization says that the core is the only ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1432-1270', '0020-7276']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00798-6