Hardness results for multicast cost sharing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Hardness Results for Multicast Cost Sharing
We continue the study of multicast cost sharing from the viewpoints of both computational complexity and economic mechanism design. We provide fundamental lower bounds on the network complexity of group-strategyproof, budget-balanced mechanisms. We also extend a classical impossibility result in game theory to show that no strategyproof mechanism can be both approximately efficient and approxim...
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In multi-point Internet communication such as multicast, sometimes there is the need to share the cost of communication between the several agents involved in the connection. This work presents some of the most commonly used incentive-compatible, individual-rational mechanisms that select the participating users and their cost share in a multicast transmission, focusing on efficiency and/or bud...
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A large amount of Internet applications, involve multiple clients getting service from a single server. Unicast as the traditional routing scheme is inefficient in terms of resource allocation dealing with such applications. Unicast scheme necessitates that the source forwards the same data multiple times for each user, placing a large load on the server and wasting the resources. Multicast rou...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0304-3975
DOI: 10.1016/s0304-3975(03)00085-9