Growth, selection and appropriate contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Semantic Prosody: Its Knowledge and Appropriate Selection of Equivalents
In translation, choosing appropriate equivalent is essential to convey the right message from source-text to target-text, and one of the issues that may have a determinative role in appropriate equivalent choice is the semantic prosody (SP) behavior of words and the relation existing between the SP of a word and semantic senses (i.e. negativity, positivity or neutrality) of its collocations in ...
متن کاملSemantic Prosody: Its Knowledge and Appropriate Selection of Equivalents
In translation, choosing appropriate equivalent is essential to convey the right message from source-text to target-text, and one of the issues that may have a determinative role in appropriate equivalent choice is the semantic prosody (SP) behavior of words and the relation existing between the SP of a word and semantic senses (i.e. negativity, positivity or neutrality) of its collocations in ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Dynamics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1094-2025
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2013.03.001