Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
We put forward a model of private goods with externalities. Agents derive benefit from communicating with each other. In order to communicate they need to operate on a common platform. Adopting new platforms is costly. We first provide an algorithm that determines the efficient outcome. Then we prove that no individually rational and feasible Groves mechanism exists. We provide sufficient condi...
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The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCGmechanism (also known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Unfortunately, the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget balanced. That is, under such mechanisms, payments may flow into or out of the system of the agents, resulting in deficits or reduced utilities for the agents. We co...
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A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents’ valuations, without introducing incentives for agents to misreport their preferences. The class of Groves mechanisms achieves this; however, these mechanisms require the agents to make payments, thereby reducing the agents’ total welfare. In this paper we ...
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Groves and Ledyard (1977) construct a mechanism for public goods procurement that can be viewed as a direct-revelation Groves mechanism in which agents announce a parameter of a quadratic approximation of their true preferences. The mechanism’s Nash equilibrium outcomes are efficient. The budget is balanced because Groves mechanisms are balanced for the announced quadratic preferences. Tian (19...
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In my 1992 paper in Economic Notes, I argued that the traditional heuristic interpretation of taxes in the pivotal mechanism (in terms of the utility loss imposed by the taxed individual on the rest of society) is not correct, since it takes into account only the effect that the individual has on the decision concerning the project and disregards the effect that the same individual has on the t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Design
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1434-4742,1434-4750
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-015-0180-y