Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategy - proofness and Pareto - efficiency in quasi - linear exchange economies ∗
In this paper, we revisit a long-standing question on the structure of strategyproof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz (1972)). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auctiondesign, we show that in a specific quasi-linear domain, every Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof SCF satisfying non-bossiness and a mild continuit...
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In a production economy where a single private good is produced via a non-linear concave technology, no direct mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness and efficiency if the preference domain contains the class of linear preferences. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set of arguments should be evaluated. It is crucial not only to ensure that the outcome is logically ...
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A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger r...
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We study a standard model of exchange economies with individual endowments. It is well known that no rule is individually rational, e cient, and strategyproof. In order to quantify the extent of this impossibility, we parametrize axioms on allocation rules. Given an axiom A, a parametrization of A is a continuum of axioms {δ-A}δ∈[0,1] such that (i) δ-A is equivalent to A only if δ = 1; (ii) δ-A...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141727