Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes

Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes *

Using the traditional model of voluntary public good provision, it is shown that an expansion of group size exacerbates free riding tendencies as long as private consumption and the public good are strictly normal and weak gross substitutes. This result generalizes a previous Cobb–Douglas example with respect to preferences and asymmetric equilibria.  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights rese...

Preschoolers are sensitive to free riding in a public goods game

Despite the benefits of cooperation, selfish individuals often produce outcomes where everyone is worse off. This "tragedy of the commons" has been demonstrated experimentally in adults with the public goods game. Contributions to a public good decline over time due to free-riders who keep their endowments. Little is known about how children behave when confronted with this social dilemma. Fort...

Coalition formation with local public goods and group-size effect

Many public goods that are provided by coalitions have a group-size e¤ect. Namely, people prefer to consume a public good in a larger coalition. This paper studies local public goods games with anonymous and separable group-size e¤ect. The core is nonempty when coalition feasible sets are monotonic and players’preferences over public goods satisfy a condition called cardinal connectedness. More...

Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods

Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding, regardless of the size or structure of groups. However, experiments show that people will punish free riders, even at considerable cost. To examine the implications of agents who punis...

When private parts are made public goods: the economics of market-inalienability.