Groundwater Usage and Strategic Complements: Part II (Revealed Preferences)

Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferences

We study an online linear classification problem, in which the data is generated by strategic agents who manipulate their features in an effort to change the classification outcome. In rounds, the learner deploys a classifier, and an adversarially chosen agent arrives, possibly manipulating her features to optimally respond to the learner. The learner has no knowledge of the agents’ utility fun...

Utility, Revealed Preferences Theory, and Strategic Ambiguity in Iterated Games

Iterated games, in which the same economic interaction is repeatedly played between the same agents, are an important framework for understanding the effectiveness of strategic choices over time. To date, very little work has applied information theory to the information sets used by agents in order to decide what action to take next in such strategic situations. This article looks at the mutua...

Information complements, substitutes, and strategic product design

Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability

We study agents whose expected utility preferences are interdependent for informational or psychological reasons. We characterize when two types can be “strategically distinguished” in the sense that they are guaranteed to behave differently in some finite mechanism. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they have different hierarchies of interdependent prefere...

Strategic Topology Switching for Security-Part II: Detection & Switching Topologies

This two-part paper considers strategic topology switching for the second-order multi-agent system under attack. In Part II, we propose a strategy on switching topologies to reveal zero-dynamics attack. We first study the detectability of zero-dynamics attack for the second-order multi-agent system under switching topology, which has requirements on the switching times and switching topologies....