Gradualism in Transition-Uzbekistan

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منابع مشابه

Uzbekistan: Welfare Impact of Slow Transition

v UZBEKISTAN: WELFARE IMPACT OF SLOW TRANSITION 1

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Bulletin of the Japan Association for Comparative Economic Studies

سال: 2002

ISSN: 1348-4060,1883-9800

DOI: 10.5760/jjce2002.39.97