Grades of Inductive Skepticism

نویسندگان

چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Inductive Rules, Background Knowledge, and Skepticism

This essay defends the view that inductive reasoning involves following inductive rules against objections that inductive rules are undesirable because they ignore background knowledge and unnecessary because Bayesianism is not an inductive rule. I propose that inductive rules be understood as sets of functions from data to hypotheses that are intended as solutions to inductive problems. Accord...

متن کامل

Resolving Goodman’s Paradox How to Defuse Inductive Skepticism

Subjective Bayesian inference is unsuitable as an ideal for learning strategies to approximate, as the arbitrariness in prior probabilities makes claims to Bayesian learning too easily vulnerable to inductive skepticism. An objective Bayesian approach, which determines priors by maximizing information entropy, runs into insurmountable difficulties in conditions where no definite background theo...

متن کامل

No Free Lunch Theorem , Inductive Skepticism , and the Optimality of Meta - Induction Word count : 4986

The no free lunch theorem (Wolpert 1996) is a radicalized version of Hume's induction skepticism. It asserts that relative to a uniform probability distribution over all possible worlds, all computable prediction algorithms  whether 'clever' inductive or 'stupid' guessing methods (etc.)  have the same expected predictive success. This theorem seems to be in conflict with results about meta-in...

متن کامل

Charcot's skepticism.

This paper brings a short review about a peculiar characteristic of Professor Charcot, the father of neurology: the skepticism, emphasizing his personal view regarding the prognosis of several neurological conditions.

متن کامل

Skepticism and Naturalism : Can Philosophical Skepticism be Scientifically Tested ?

It may be possible to scientifically test philosophical skepticism; at least this is what I shall maintain. The argument develops the naturalistic insight that there may be no particular reason to suppose that nature has selected Homo sapiens’ epistemic capacities such that we are ideally suited to forming a true theory of everything, or indeed, a true theory of much of anything. Just as chimpa...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Philosophy of Science

سال: 2014

ISSN: 0031-8248,1539-767X

DOI: 10.1086/676637