Governors and directors: Competing models of corporate governance

Corporate Governance When Founders Are Directors

We examine the role of founders as directors by examining executive compensation, CEO retention policies, and M&A decisions in firms where founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEO than other firms. Pay for performance sensitivity for non-founder CEOs in founder-director firms is al...

Corporate Governance , Board of Directors , and Firm Performance

Identifying influential directors in the United States corporate governance network.

The influence of directors has been one of the most engaging topics recently, but surprisingly little research has been done to quantitatively evaluate the influence and power of directors. We analyze the structure of the US corporate governance network for the 11-year period 1996-2006 based on director data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center director database, and we develop a ce...

The Capricious Cushion: The Implications of the Directors and Insurance Liability Crisis on Canadian Corporate Governance

One of the clearest legacies of the growing concern expressed over the international competitiveness of Canadian and American businesses has been the urgency it has lent to a very old debate respecting the efficacy of the apparatus used to govern the business and affairs of large, public corporations. For instance, Michael Porter, one of the most articulate if not the most prolific of the new c...

Directors' Incentives and Corporate Performance

We examine the effect of the incentives of the members of the board of directors on shareholder wealth, CEO compensation and the sensitivity of this compensation to corporate performance in laboratory setting. Two methods of appointing the board, one by the CEO and the other by the largest shareholder, constitute the main treatment. The board sets the compensation for the CEO, who makes product...