Governments, Competition and Utility Regulation

Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments

Many political economists believe that competition among countries—or regions within them—to attract mobile capital disciplines their governments, motivating them to invest more in infrastructure, reduce waste and corruption, and spend less on non-productive public goods. The result should be convergence on business-friendly policies and clean government. The notion that mobile capital discipli...

Endogenizing governments' objectives in tax competition

a r t i c l e i n f o In this paper we endogenize objective functions of the regions in case the of tax competition for foreign owned mobile capital. First, considering symmetric regions and simultaneous move tax competition, we demonstrate that the competing regions can restrict 'race-to-the-bottom' in tax rates by deviating away from social welfare to net tax revenue. Moreover, it is optimal ...

The taming of Leviathan: Competition among governments

Clusters and Competition New Agendas for Companies , Governments , and Institutions

the company level has been dominated by what goes on inside companies. Thinking about the competitiveness of nations and states has focused on the economy as a whole, with national economic policy seen as the dominant influence. In both competition and competitiveness the role of location is all but absent. If anything, the tendency has been to see location as diminishing in importance. Globali...

Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization and Corruption

Many political economists believe that competition among countries—or regions within them—to attract mobile capital should discipline their governments, rendering them less corrupt and more friendly toward business. This argument surfaces repeatedly in debates over both political decentralization and globalization. We argue that it is based on an assumption— countries or regions start out ident...