Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Transfers and Altruistic Punishments in Third Party Punishment Game Experiments
Our research is a variant of the third party punishment game. In particular, we want to test whether players have heterogeneous preferences; the levels of the sanction and of the transfer are proportional to the unfairness of the Dictator; the change of the role influences the Observer’s reaction to unfair behavior; players’ decision to punish the Dictator and/or to help the Receiver depends on...
متن کاملInternational Private Transfers and Labor Participation in
International migration and private transfers by immigrant workers to their home countries have proved to be vital elements in the economic sustainability of small nations in Latin America. These transfers, identified as remittances, are one of the largest foreign financial inflows into El Salvador, exceeding garment manufacturing exports and official foreign aid. However, remittances may induc...
متن کاملTransfers and altruistic punishment in Solomon's Game experiments
Our research is a variant of the third party punishment game that we call Solomon’s Game. The main feature of this game is that players can not only punish unfair people but also help those individuals who are the victims of that unfairness. The aim of this experiment is to compare the human tendency to punish unfair behavior to the desire to help victims of that unfairness, in presence of a bu...
متن کاملStrategic altruistic transfers and rent seeking within the family
This paper examines the rent-seeking behavior of “selfish” children in competing for parental transfers. The paper extends Chang and Weisman (South Econ J 71:821–836, 2005), that focuses on compensated transfers, to allow for non-compensated transfers à la Buchanan (J Law Econ 26:71–85, 1983) and derives results for the case in which children’s time contributions as perceived by their parents a...
متن کاملGovernmental Transfers Can Reduce a Moral Hazard Problem
An altruistic agent who may aid a person with a low income may cause that person to exert little effort to increase his income. Such behavior generates a Dilemma, in which welfare is lower than when no one is altruistic. We show how governmental transfers, which do not allow for reallocation from a person who saves much to one who saves little, reduces the effect, and can lead to an outcome whi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Population Economics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0933-1433,1432-1475
DOI: 10.1007/s00148-014-0503-2