Government Ownership, Informed Trading, and Private Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Informed trading and the 'leakage' of information
This paper, in a Shapley-Shubik market game framework, examines the effect of “leakage” of information: private information becoming available to uninformed traders at a later date. We show that (a) If information acquisition by the informed traders is costless, this leads to faster revelation of information; (b) If information acquisition is costly, there may be no acquisition of information; ...
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This paper investigates the insider trading before scheduled versus unscheduled corporate announcements to explore how corporate insiders utilise their private information in response to the time-varying liquidity trading. Using a comprehensive insider trading database, we show that: (1) the insider’s propensity to trade increases in the amount of liquidity trading before both the scheduled and...
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This paper characterizes informed trade when speculators can acquire distinct signals of varying quality about an asset’s value at different dates. The most reasonable characterization of private information about stocks is that while information is longlived, new information will arrive over time, information that may be acquired by others. Hence, while a speculator may know more than others a...
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This paper examines the information content of trades by different participants via different trading channels in the spot foreign exchange market. Using spot FX transactions of a major Australian bank, we find that central banks have the greatest price impact, followed by nonbank financial institutions such as hedge funds and mutual funds. Trades by non-financial corporations have the least im...
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Informed Trading and the Pricing of Good and Bad Private Information in the Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns We decompose PIN, the Probability of Informed Trading, into components that capture informed trading on good news (PIN G) and on bad news (PIN B), and provide new evidence that PIN and its components capture informed trading around quarterly earnings announcements. Our principal r...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1333999