Government Intervention and Strategic Trading in the U.S. Treasury Market
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Government Intervention and Strategic Trading in the U.S. Treasury Market
We study the impact of outright (i.e., permanent) Open Market Operations (POMOs) by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) on the microstructure of the secondary U.S. Treasury market. POMOs are trades in U.S. Treasury securities aimed at accomplishing the Federal Reserve’s target level of the federal funds rate. Our analysis is motivated by a parsimonious model of speculative trading in t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1769773