Government guarantees and self-fulfilling speculative attacks

Government guarantees and self-fulfilling speculative attacks

This paper explores the role played by government guarantees to banks’ foreign creditors as a root cause of self-fulfilling twin banking-currency crises. We develop a general equilibrium model in which such guarantees lead to these types of crises. Absent government guarantees, such crises are not possible. The model has three key properties. First, in the presence of government guarantees bank...

Government Guarantees and Self-FulÞlling Speculative Attacks

Expectations and Contagion in Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks

This paper shows how expectations-driven contagion of currency crises can arise even if the currency market has a unique equilibrium when viewed in isolation. The model of Morris and Shin (1998) is extended to allow speculators to trade in a second currency market. If speculators believe that a devaluation of this other currency will make a domestic devaluation more likely, they will engage in ...

The Effects of Economic Sanctions and Speculative Attacks on Inflation

This paper surveys the persian monetary crises due to economic sanctions and speculative attacks that leads to high inflation. Economic sanctions are associated with various forms of trade barriers and restriction on financial transactions. Among the most influential sanctions on Iran's oil export and central bank sanctions are noted that their Aims to reduce Iran's oil revenues and Devaluation...

Dynamic Speculative Attacks

The paper presents a model of rational Bayesian agents with speculative attacks in a regime of exchange rate which is pegged within a band. Speculators learn from the observation of the exchange rate within the band whether their mass is sufficiently large for a successful attack. Multiple periods are necessary for the existence of speculative attacks. Various defense policies are analyzed. A t...