Goal Setting in the Principal-Agent Model: Weak Incentives for Strong Performance

نویسندگان
چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-task Principal–Agent Model*

This paper reports on a two-task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece-rate contracts. Many principals reward high effort on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high effort on both tasks. In contrast,...

متن کامل

Steps toward the weak higher category of weak higher categories in the globular setting

We start this article by rebuilding higher operads of weak higher transformations, and correct those in cite{Cambat}. As in cite{Cambat} we propose an operadic approach for weak higher $n$-transformations, for each $ninmathbb{N}$, where such weak higher $n$-transformations are seen as algebras for specific contractible higher operads. The last chapter of this article asserts that, up to precise...

متن کامل

A New Model for the Secondary Goal in DEA

The purpose of the current paper is to propose a new model for the secondary goal in DEA by introducing secondary objective function. The proposed new model minimizes the average of the absolute deviations of data points from their median. Similar problem is studied in a related model by Liang et al. (2008), which minimizes the average of the absolute deviations of data points from their mean. ...

متن کامل

WEAK AND STRONG DUALITY THEOREMS FOR FUZZY CONIC OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS

The objective of this paper is to deal with the fuzzy conic program- ming problems. The aim here is to derive weak and strong duality theorems for a general fuzzy conic programming. Toward this end, The convexity-like concept of fuzzy mappings is introduced and then a speci c ordering cone is established based on the parameterized representation of fuzzy numbers. Un- der this setting, duality t...

متن کامل

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi - Task Principal - Agent Model Ernst

This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high efforts on both tasks. In contras...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal

سال: 2016

ISSN: 1556-5068

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2837759