Global coordination: weighted voting

Mathematics of Voting – Weighted Voting Systems

Weighted Approval Voting

To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting [7] by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of,...

Dynamic weighted voting games

We initiate the study of dynamic cooperative games—cooperative games where the characteristic function may change over time. We introduce two types of algorithmic problems for such games: computing a given solution concept at time t, and checking that a certain function of the game (e.g., the Shapley value of a given player or the value of the least core) remains within given bounds during time...

Reliability Weighted Voting Games

We examine agent failures in weighted voting games. In our cooperative game model, R-WVG, each agent has a weight and a survival probability, and the value of an agent coalition is the probability that its surviving members would have a total weight exceeding a threshold. We propose algorithms for computing the value of a coalition, finding stable payoff allocations, and estimating the power of...

Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting

Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter’s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disp...