Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider a set of voters who express preferences about two alternatives, indifferences included. characterize the class all strategy-proof and anonymous social choice functions by means geometric property related to an integer triangular grid representing number supporting each alternatives.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1879-3118', '0165-4896']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.01.001