Generic uniqueness of the bias vector of finite zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Policy iteration algorithm for zero-sum multichain stochastic games with mean payoff and perfect information
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces, perfect information, mean payoff criteria, without any irreducibility assumption on the Markov chains associated to strategies (multichain games). The value of such a game can be characterized by a system of nonlinear equations, involving the mean payoff vector and an auxiliary vector (relative value or bias). We develop...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0022-247X
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmaa.2017.07.017