Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Security Games: Solution Concepts and Algorithms
Security Games: Solution Concepts and Algorithms
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0276-8