Generalized Nash Equilibria of Nonmonetized Noncooperative Games on Lattices
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: British Journal of Economics, Management & Trade
سال: 2014
ISSN: 2278-098X
DOI: 10.9734/bjemt/2014/4618