General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Privately Produced General Deterrence*
In this study, we use county data on private security establishments and employment for 1977–92 to test two hypotheses. First, we test whether private security deters crime. Second, we test whether John Lott and David Mustard’s estimates of the impact of shall-issue laws on crime are biased because of a lack of controls for private security. We find little evidence that private security reduces...
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Influencing discretionary driver behaviours in Australia relies very much on the coercive strategy of deterrence. This paper stems from a thorough review of deterrence theory and risk taking carried out in 2002-03 for the Land Transport Safety Authority, New Zealand (Elliott, 2003). The paper begins by exploring the definition of deterrence leading to the proposition that if motorists do not re...
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and other participants for their constructive comments on this paper. Purdue University is committed to the policy that all persons shall have equal access to its programs and employment without regard to race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, disability, public assistance status, veteran status or sexual orientation. The focus of this paper is on international...
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We study a model where capacity installation by an incumbent firm serves to deter others from entering the industry. We argue that uncertainty about demand or costs forces the incumbent to choose a higher capacity level than it would under certainty. This higher level diminishes the attractiveness of deter rence (Proposition 1) and, therefore, the range of parameter values for which deterrence ...
متن کاملResidual Deterrence ∗
Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in offending, or “residual deterrence”. We provide a theory of residual deterrence which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential offenders. Our theory rests on the costs of reallocating enforcement resources. In light o...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Interactions
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0305-0629,1547-7444
DOI: 10.1080/03050620903554069