Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Nominal Bargaining Power, Selection Protocol and Discounting in Legislative Bargaining∗
The effects of changes in nominal bargaining power, the proposal selection rule and discounting in legislative bargaining outcomes are investigated. The comparative static predictions of the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model better organize behavior than does Gamsons Law (1961). However, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted under Baron-Ferejohn as coalition partners refuse to take the...
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Realism and liberalism disagree over the source of bargaining power in international relations. Realists believe that the success of a negotiator is a linear function of the capabilities that its home state possesses. Liberals stress the crucial importance of either the relative salience a country attaches to a contested issue or the importance negotiating governments have to attribute to power...
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One of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents. However, all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to and do engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal. We conduct an experimental test of the Baron-...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3966891