GATT: A cooperative equilibrium in a noncooperative trading regime?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of International Economics
سال: 1991
ISSN: 0022-1996
DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(91)90044-7