Games With Tolerant Players

Games With Tolerant Players

A notion of π-tolerant equilibrium is defined that takes into account that players have some tolerance regarding payoffs in a game. This solution concept generalizes Nash and refines ε-Nash equilibrium in a natural way. We show that π-tolerant equilibrium can explain cooperation in social dilemmas such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Public Good game. We then examine the structure of particularly...

Security Games with Mobile Players

Sequencing games with repeated players

Two classes of one machine sequencing situations are considered in which each job corresponds to exactly one player but a player may have more than one job to be processed, so called RP(repeated player) sequencing situations. In max-RP sequencing situations it is assumed that each player’s cost function is linear with respect to the maximum completion time of his jobs, whereas in min-RP sequenc...

Repeated Games with Forgetful Players∗

We present a model to investigate the behavior of forgetful players in infinitely repeated games. We assume that each player may forget the entire history of the play with a fixed probability. Our modeling specifications make a clear distinction between absentminded and forgetful players. We consider two extreme cases regarding the correlation of forgetfulness of the players. In the first case,...

Games with Procedurally Rational Players

We study interactive situations in which players are boundedly rational. Each player, rather than optimizing given a belief about the other players' behavior, as in the theory of Nash equilibrium, uses the following choice procedure. She rst associates one consequence with each of her actions by sampling (literally or virtually) each of her actions once. Then she chooses the action that has the...