Games with possibly naive present-biased players

Repeated games with present-biased preferences

We study infinitely repeated games with observable actions, where players have present-biased (so-called β-δ) preferences. We give a two-step procedure to characterize Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoffs: compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques, and then use this set to characterize the equilibrium payoff set U(β, δ). While Strotz-Pollak equilibrium and subgame perfection d...

Games With Tolerant Players

A notion of π-tolerant equilibrium is defined that takes into account that players have some tolerance regarding payoffs in a game. This solution concept generalizes Nash and refines ε-Nash equilibrium in a natural way. We show that π-tolerant equilibrium can explain cooperation in social dilemmas such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Public Good game. We then examine the structure of particularly...

Biased Games

We present a novel extension of normal form games that we call biased games. In these games, a player’s utility is influenced by the distance between his mixed strategy and a given base strategy. We argue that biased games capture important aspects of the interaction between software agents. Our main result is that biased games satisfying certain mild conditions always admit an equilibrium. We ...

Security Games with Mobile Players

Sequencing games with repeated players

Two classes of one machine sequencing situations are considered in which each job corresponds to exactly one player but a player may have more than one job to be processed, so called RP(repeated player) sequencing situations. In max-RP sequencing situations it is assumed that each player’s cost function is linear with respect to the maximum completion time of his jobs, whereas in min-RP sequenc...