Games with Graph Restricted Communication and Levels Structure of Cooperation

Col.lecció d’Economia E17/363 Games with Graph Restricted Communication and Levels Structure of Cooperation

We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents is restricted both by a communication graph and by a sequence of embedded partitions of the agent set. For this type of problem, we define and characterize two new values extending the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value respectively. Our results enable the axiomatic comparison between the two values and provide some basic ...

Hedonic Games with Graph-restricted Communication

We study hedonic coalition formation games in which cooperation among the players is restricted by a graph structure: a subset of players can form a coalition if and only if they are connected in the given graph. We investigate the complexity of finding stable outcomes in such games, for several notions of stability. In particular, we provide an efficient algorithm that finds an individually st...

Hierarchies, communication and restricted cooperation in cooperative games

Cores of games with restricted cooperation

Games with restricted cooperation are cooperative N-person games with sidepayments, where the collection of feasible coalitions need not comprise all subsets of players and thus is restricted. We study balanced and completely balanced games in this context and derive the cotresponding core theorems from a sandwich theorem for set functions within the setting of linear programming. In particular...

Values for graph-restricted games with coalition structure

We consider a new model of a TU game endowed with both coalition and twolevel cooperation structures that applies to various network situations. The approach to the value is close to that of both Myerson [1977] and Aumann and Drèze [1974]: it is based on ideas of component efficiency and one or another deletion link property, and it treats an a priori union as a self-contained unit; moreover, o...