Games under Ambiguous Payoffs and Optimistic Attitudes

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چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Applied Mathematics

سال: 2014

ISSN: 1110-757X,1687-0042

DOI: 10.1155/2014/531987