Game Theory and Demonstratives

Abstract This paper argues, based on Lewis’ claim that communication is a coordination game (Lewis in Minnesota studies the philosophy of science, University Press, Minneapolis, pp 3–35, 1975), we can account for communicative function demonstratives without assuming they semantically refer. The appeal such theoretical version case non-referentialism role be accounted entering cul de sac trying to construct conventions ever-increasing complexity. Instead via explained with reference general, non-domain specific ability human beings solve games coordination. Furthermore, there empirical support view. Judgments concerning demonstrative have been shown sensitive judgments common ground (Clark et al. J Verb Learn Behav 22:245–258, 1983), which exactly what non-referentialist would predict. also allows an intuitively plausible, treatment Speaks’ ‘trumping argument’ (Speaks Philos Stud 174:709–734, 2017), as well Carnap/Agnew puzzle (Kaplan Syntax Semant 9:221–43, 1970).