Game-Theoretic Models of Moral and Other-Regarding Agents (extended abstract)

نویسندگان

چکیده

We investigate Kantian equilibria in finite normal form games, a class of non-Nashian, morally motivated courses action that was recently proposed the economics literature. highlight number problems with such equilibria, including computational intractability, high price miscoordination, and problematic extension to general games. give generalization based on concept program point out practically relevant may not exist. To remedy this we propose some general, intuitive, computationally tractable, other-regarding are special cases as well interpolates between purely self-regarding behavior.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Electronic proceedings in theoretical computer science

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['2075-2180']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.4204/eptcs.335.19