Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge
We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like "rationality at a node" and "knowledge at a node." We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own "theory of the game." The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Logic, Language and Information
سال: 1995
ISSN: 0925-8531,1572-9583
DOI: 10.1007/bf01048618