Game theoretic analysis of a three-stage interconnected forward and reverse supply chain

نویسندگان

چکیده

The dynamic economic scenario of today ensures that industrial and environmental policies contribute to greener supply chain are incorporated. This paper considers an interconnected three-stage forward reverse chain, which provides green products a conscious market. procurement raw materials is responsible for the first stage chain; second manufacturing/remanufacturing process; third marketing consumer. There one supplier, manufacturer, retailer in chain. New used this new manufactured sold. also market remanufactured products, market, same sells products. collector, remanufacturer, From consumers, collector collects processes remanufacturable ones remanufacturer. If supplied by not adequate satisfy demand, remanufacturer purchases remainder from seller. Both manufacturer use manufacturing processes. Two models, namely centralized model decentralized model, formulated. A numerical example taken illustrate two perform sensitivity analysis.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Environment, Development and Sustainability

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1573-2975', '1387-585X']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-021-01770-w