Game equilibria and unification dynamics in networks with heterogeneous agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria
There are games with a unique Nash equilibrium but such that, for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the bestreply dynamics. MSC classification. Primary: 91A22 ; Secondary: 34A34, 34A60.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Engineering Business Management
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1847-9790,1847-9790
DOI: 10.1177/1847979017731670